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This study measured proactive and reactive response inhibition and their relationships
with self-reported impulsivity. We examined the domains of both vocal and manual
responding using a stop signal task (SST) with two stop probabilities: high and low
probability stop (1/3 and 1/6 stops respectively). Our aim was to evaluate the effect
stop probability would have on reactive and proactive inhibition. We tested 44 subjects
and found that for the high compared to low probability stop signal condition, more
proactive inhibition was evident and this was correlated with a reduction in the stop
signal reaction time (SSRT). We found that reactive inhibition had a positive relationship
with dysfunctional but not functional impulsivity in both vocal and manual domains
of responding. These findings support the hypothesis that proactive inhibition may
pre-activate the network for reactive inhibition.
Keywords: vocal inhibition, selective inhibition, response inhibition, reactive inhibition, proactive inhibition,
impulsivity, dysfunctional impulsivity
Introduction
This study measured response inhibition via the stop signal paradigm (Vince, 1948; Lappin and
Eriksen, 1966; Logan and Cowan, 1984) in two effector systems: vocal and manual. Response
inhibition is described as the ability to stop a prepotent response (Logan and Cowan, 1984; Logan,
1994), which, in our study was either a spoken word or a button press. We measured two types
of response inhibition: proactive and reactive inhibition. Proactive inhibition is defined as the
advanced preparation to halt action in the anticipation of an imminent stop signal. Reactive
inhibition is defined as the performance of outright stopping in response to the appearance of a
stop signal (Chambers et al., 2009; Aron, 2011).
The analysis of the stop signal task (SST) is based on the horse race model proposed by Logan
and Cowan (1984). The model assumes that the stop and the go processes are independent of each
other in the sense that whichever finishes first, wins. This assumption is based on the fact that
failed stop trials always have faster mean reaction times (RTs) compared to go trials, suggesting
that participants fail to stop because the go process finishes before the stop process. For a model
that proposes the go and stop processes interact, see Boucher et al. (2007). The horse race model
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was mainly developed by testing reactive inhibition (measured
by the stop signal RT or SSRT) but has been little tested in
the context of proactive inhibition manipulations (measured by
the increment of go RTs in the context of possible stop signal
appearance). Some evidence suggests that the complexity of go
and stop tasks affect the latency of go and stop RTs. For example,
regarding the complexity of the go task: go RTs are always slower
in two or more choice-RT tasks than in simple RT tasks. Likewise
the SSRT is longer when the go imperative consists of a choice
RT task compared to a simple RT task (Logan et al., 1984; Riegler,
1986). Such observations suggest that the complexity of the go
task interferes with both go and stop processes. Regarding the
complexity of the stop task, some studies have increased the
stop signal from one to two and asked participants to stop to
one but to ignore the other stop signal (this refers to selective
inhibition; Logan et al., 1986; Riegler, 1986). These studies find
that go RTs are slower and SSRTs longer in selective inhibition
tasks compared to simple inhibition tasks, suggesting that the
complexity of the stop task interacts with both go and stop
processes. In sum, the complexity of the go and the stop task
interfere with each other. When either the go or stop task is
complex, go RTs become slower and SSRTs become longer.
We interpreted these results to indicate that the complexity
of the go and stop tasks added an additional variable: a slowing
effect, which would probably help to perform either task more
effectively. In particular, selective inhibition creates the need
to hold the prepotent response more strongly because the
stopping process is more complicated, requiring an increase in
proactive inhibition. In other words, our idea was that in selective
inhibition, proactive inhibition is increased to help reactive
inhibition. In fact, this idea has already been supported by
Chikazoe et al. (2009) and in the first experiment of Jahfari et al.
(2010) who reported a significant negative relationship between
proactive inhibition and the SSRT, a result which suggests that a
greater level of preparation is related to faster reactive stopping.
It has also been suggested that, proactive inhibition pre-activates
the same inhibitory network for reactive inhibition and this is
why participants are able to stop quickly, because the inhibitory
network has been primed.
However, studies of the relationship between proactive and
reactive inhibition have had mixed results: a third experiment
reported in Jahfari et al. (2010) showed this relationship did
not exist. The authors did not offer an explanation. We propose
that the lack of a relationship could have been due to the
amount of proactive inhibition that was used in these tasks:
while in their first experiment proactive inhibition was measured
as a slowing of go RT of 111.3ms for the relevant compared
to an irrelevant stop condition, in the third experiment this
difference was only 55ms. To investigate this idea, this study
was designed to manipulate the level of proactive inhibition and
assess the relationship between proactive and reactive inhibition.
One way to manipulate the level of proactive inhibition is
to manipulate stop probabilities. However, previous studies
that have manipulated stop probability have shown that either
there were no differences in the SSRT (Ramautar et al., 2004;
Lansbergen et al., 2007) or they did not analyse the SSRT
(Logan and Burkell, 1986). The lack of difference in SSRT could
have been because the high probability stop in Ramautar et al.
(2004) contained 1/2 stop and 1/2 go trials, which may not have
been enough to induce significant proactive inhibition; on the
other hand, Lansbergen et al. (2007) recruited participants with
the lowest and highest scores on impulsivity, which may have
influenced the lack of differences across stop probabilities.
Deficiencies in reactive inhibition have been related to speech
disorders such as developmental stuttering (Eggers et al., 2013),
Tourette syndrome (Ziemann et al., 1997), attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Barkley, 1997; Rubia et al., 2001a;
Aron and Poldrack, 2005), schizophrenia (Kiehl et al., 2000;
Enticott et al., 2008), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and
trichotillomania (Menzies et al., 2007; Penadés et al., 2007; Bohne
et al., 2008) and adolescents at risk of alcoholism and other
substance use (Nigg et al., 2006). Interestingly, studies have
shown that differences in response inhibition can be related to
the level of self-reported impulsivity in control subjects (Logan
et al., 1997; van den Wildenberg and Christoffels, 2010).
Studies investigating impulsivity and reactive inhibition have
reported, for example, slower manual reactive inhibition (i.e.,
SSRT from manual responses) in individuals with high relative
to low impulsivity scores (Logan et al., 1997; Marsh et al.,
2002; Farr et al., 2012) but others have failed to find such
differences (Avila and Parcet, 2001; Rodrìguez-Fornells et al.,
2002; Lijffijt et al., 2004; Lansbergen et al., 2007). Moreover,
evidence suggests a positive relationship existed between reactive
inhibition and impulsivity, which in turn suggests that longer
SSRTs are associated with higher impulsivity scores. This positive
relationship has been described in the manual effector system
only (Logan et al., 1997). In a more recent study, van den
Wildenberg and Christoffels (2010) found that longer SSRT
were related with dysfunctional impulsivity (not functional
impulsivity) for vocal responses (not manual responses). This
study is very interesting because it teased apart two types
of impulsivity: dysfunctional impulsivity, described as rapid
reactions with a less adaptive approach (Dickman, 1990)
and functional impulsivity, characterized as rapid responses
in situations where this is more optimal (a more adaptive
approach). Having a relationship between reactive inhibition and
dysfunctional impulsivity is consistent with neuropsychological
disorders where impulsive behaviors are inappropriate and less
adaptive (Barkley, 1997; Kiehl et al., 2000; Rubia et al., 2001a;
Aron and Poldrack, 2005; Menzies et al., 2007; Penadés et al.,
2007; Bohne et al., 2008; Enticott et al., 2008). Although, the
evidence from manual response inhibition studies suggests that
impulsivity is also related to longer SSRTs (Logan et al., 1997),
van den Wildenberg and Christoffels (2010) only found that
dysfunctional impulsivity was related with vocal responses (not
manual responses), possibly because of the relatively small
sample size (14 participants).
In sum, there is evidence that suggests a greater level of
proactive inhibition enhanced reactive inhibition, but one out
of three experiments did not show this relationship. It is
not clear why. Second, two studies have shown that manual
response inhibition is related to impulsivity but two other
studies fail to confirm this. More recent evidence has used a
impulsivity scale that distinguishes between dysfunctional and
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functional impulsivity and found that high score in dysfunctional
impulsivity is related to slower SSRTs with vocal not manual
responses, finding that would contradict a previous study
that have shown manual responses are related to impulsivity.
In other to clarify these inconsistencies, our aims were to
investigate across two response modalities (vocal and manual)
the relationship between proactive and reactive inhibition, and
the relationship between dysfunctional impulsivity and reactive
inhibition in both manual and vocal responses. We developed an
SST with two certainty conditions (certain and uncertain, similar
to Chikazoe et al., 2009). While the certain conditions only
had go trials, the uncertain conditions contained both go and
stop trials. We manipulated proactive inhibition in the uncertain
conditions by implementing two stop probability conditions:
high and low (similar to Logan and Burkell, 1986; Ramautar
et al., 2004; Lansbergen et al., 2007). The high probability stop
condition consisted of 1/3 stops and 2/3 go trials; the opposite
was the case for the low probability stop condition, which was
comprised of 1/6 stops and 5/6 go trials. We predicted that the
high probability stop condition would induce more proactive
inhibition relative to the low probability stop condition. We also
predicted that the high level of proactive inhibition in the high
probability stop would make SSRTs shorter. We hypothesized
that if high, relative to low probability stops required more
proactive inhibition, then the SSRT would be reduced for the
high probability stopping. Further, we hypothesized that there
would be a positive relationship between proactive and reactive
inhibition. Our final aim was to re-investigate the relationship
between dysfunctional impulsivity and reactive inhibition in both
effector systems; our prediction was that manual responses would
also be related to dysfunctional impulsivity. We hypothesized
that the SSRT of both vocal and manual responses would be
positively correlated with dysfunctional impulsivity.
Methods
Participants
Forty-six participants completed this study. Two participants
were excluded because they did not meet the SST performance
criteria of successfully stopping on ∼50% of stop trials; one of
these subjects progressively slowed throughout the experiment
on the uncertain go trials and thus, this person was able to
stop on 96% of the stops (p_inhibit = 0.96). The second
person did the opposite and did not stop appropriately at the
stop-signal, returning a percentage of unsuccessful stopping
of 23% (p_respond = 0.23). Data analysis was performed
on the remaining 44 participants (age range = 18–29; mean
age = 20.5 years; SD = 2.73; 8 males). All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and reported no history
of neurological impairment or psychiatric illness. All participants
provided written informed consent. The study was approved by
Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee.
Apparatus
The experimental task was controlled in Presentation R© software
(version 16.1, www.neurobs.com) and was delivered via Samsung
monitor (SyncMaster SA950_LS27A950, 27 inches, 1920 × 1080
pixels, 120Hz refresh rate). Vocal-responses were sample at
48 kHz via an external microphone placed within 2 cm from
each subject’s mouth. Manual-responses involved a key press on
a button box; Participants were seated approximately at 80 cm
from the monitor.
Stop Signal Task
This study implemented a variant of the stop-signal task or SST
(Logan and Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994). It contained three types
of trials (certain go, uncertain go, and stop) that all occurred
within every block. All trials began with a black fixation cross
appearing in the center of a white background; the duration of
fixation randomly varied between 1 and 2.5 s. Certain go trials
consisted of a simple reaction time task where participants were
required to respond as quickly as possible to the certain go-signal,
which was indicated by the onset of a blue circle, 10.5 cm in
diameter (see Figure 1) in the center of the monitor. Certain
go trials made up 50% of the total trial number. For manual
responses, participants were asked to press a response button as
quickly as possible whereas for vocal responses, participants were
asked to make the short vowel sound “I” as it would occur in
the word “hit/hIt/.” The other half of the trials was uncertain go
trials in which the onset of yellow circle was the signal to initiate
a response. The uncertainty in this trial type was created by the
possibility of a stop signal following the go signal (yellow circle).
The stop signal could appear with a probability of either one third
or two thirds of all uncertain go trials. Hereafter we refer to these
as low probability and high probability stop signals respectively.
Participants were required to respond to the yellow circle as if this
was a blue circle unless the stop-signal appeared.
FIGURE 1 | Trial structure of the stop-signal task (SST). There were three
main trial types: certain go, uncertain go and stop trials. Certain go trials were
signaled by a blue circle and always required to either press a response button
(manual-responses) or produce the short vowel sound “I” as it would occur in
the word “hit /hIt/”(vocal-responses). Uncertain go trials were signaled by a
yellow circle and required a response as in the certain go trials. Finally, stop
trials started as uncertain go trials but after the stop signal delay (SSD), a
stop-signal was presented, which was signaled by a purple circle. Participants
were instructed to attempt to withhold their responses on seeing the stop
signal. In the high probability stop condition, stop signals occurred following
2/3 of the uncertain go signals whereas in the low probability stop condition
stop signals occurred following 1/3 of the uncertain go signals.
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Stop trials appeared only after uncertain go signals and were
represented by a purple circle. In response to the stop signal,
participants were instructed to attempt to withhold any response
they might have initiated. The time at which the stop-signal was
presented is referred to as the stop-signal delay (SSD). The SSD
changed dynamically throughout the experiment via a staircase
method that depended on each participant’s performance. If a
participant inhibited successfully on a stop trial, then successful
response inhibition was made less likely on the subsequent stop
trial by increasing the SSD by 30ms. Contrarily, if the participant
failed to stop, successful response inhibition was made more
likely for the following stop trial by decreasing the SSD by
30ms. Two independently adjusted staircases were employed
that started with a SSD of 200ms. One staircase was for the
low probability stop and the other for the high. The task also
contained a warning buzz that sounded when a go response was
given after 700ms or when the SSD dropped to 130ms.
Overall, there were 900 trials in each response modality (either
manual or vocal), which were divided into 6 blocks of 150 trials.
In each block, 75 trials were certain go trials (50%) and 75
were uncertain go trials (50%). For the high probability stop
blocks, 50 of the uncertain go trials were stop trials whereas
for the low probability stop blocks, 25 were stop trials. Each
response modality was tested in separate blocks counterbalanced
for order across subjects. We also counterbalanced the high and
low probability stop blocks. To make these probability blocks
comparable, we needed to have an equal number of stop trials
for each probability of stopping, thus, out of the 6 blocks, two
blocks corresponded to the high probability stop condition (50
stop trials ∗ 2 blocks = 100 stops) and four blocks were for the
low probability stops (25 stop trials ∗ 4 blocks = 100 stops).
Because the number of blocks for the low probability stops
was double that of the high probability stops, we implemented
the condition that there would always be two low probability
stop blocks between each high probability stop block. Based on
this, we implemented two types of overall block presentation
order, which were the only possible permutations that meet the
condition of having two low probability blocks between high
probability blocks and which also allowed counterbalancing of
the order of the first probability block type over subjects. The
first order started with a high probability stop block, therefore,
block 1 and 4 were high probability stops and blocks 2, 3, 5,
and 6 were low probability stops. The second order started with
a low probability stop block (blocks 1, 2, 4, and 5) and blocks
3 and 6 were high probability stops. There were instructions at
the beginning of each block which communicated the probability
of stopping that would follow, it could either say that a stop
signal would occur on either one third or two thirds of the
uncertain trials, for example, for the low probability stop block
the instruction said: “Take a break! During the next block, stop
trials will occur on one third of the uncertain go trials (yellow
circle)” All instructions were in black text except for the words
“one third” which were colored red and the word “yellow” which
was colored yellow. Participants pressed the space bar to start the
block at which point the block number was presented for 1 s, e.g.,
“Block 1 out of 6.” In total there were 12 blocks, 6 were assigned
to vocal and 6 to manual responses. All 6 blocks per response
modality were administered sequentially. After that, the other 6
blocks of other response modality were given.
The index of reactive inhibition was measured with the stop-
signal reaction time or SSRT (Logan and Cowan, 1984) and
calculated using the integration method (Verbruggen and Logan,
2009a; Verbruggen et al., 2013). This method estimates SSRTs
by subtracting the starting time of the stop process (when
participants see a stop-signal) from the finishing time of the
stop process. The starting time is known, which is equivalent
to the SSD; however, the finishing time needs to be estimated.
The finishing time was estimated by integrating the go reaction
time (go RT) distribution. The go RTs were rank ordered from
the shortest to the longest then, the nth RT was selected. Where
n was obtained by multiplying the probability of responding on
stop trials (or unsuccessful stopping, known as the p_respond)
by the total number of go RTs. The probability of responding
was calculated as the number of unsuccessful stops divided by the
total number of stop trials. SSRT was estimated by subtracting the
SSD from nth go RT. We calculated the SSRT separately for each
block and then the average of the blocks was taken as the final
SSRT.
The index of proactive inhibition was based on two previous
studies (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Jahfari et al., 2010) where it was
respectively termed preparation cost and response delay effect.
This index is estimated from the go RT by subtracting the mean
of the uncertain go RTs from the mean of the certain go RTs. A
positive value indicates the amount of slowing the participants
applied to their go responses when stop signals were imminent.
All correlations were obtained from a Pearson’s linear
correlation (1-tailed as the proposed hypotheses were
unidirectional).
Impulsivity Inventory
We administered a version of Dickman’s impulsivity inventory
(Dickman, 1990) which measures functional and dysfunctional
impulsivity. Dysfunctional impulsivity is defined as the tendency
to act with less forethought thanmost people of same ability when
this inclination is a source of difficulty. In contrast, functional
impulsivity is the tendency to act with relatively little forethought
when such a style is optimal. This inventory has 46 questions:
11 about functional impulsivity, 12 for dysfunctional impulsivity
and 23 fillers, which were not included in any statistical analysis
(see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material).
Procedure
We first introduced the task verbally by explaining the three
types of trials and the types of responses subjects should give.
Then, the experimenter read a colored photocopy with a diagram
of the trials and response types. We explained that the time
between the stop-signal and the uncertain go signal (i.e., SSD)
changed according to the participant’s performance and that if
they successfully stopped, the next stop trial would be harder
because the SSD was going to be longer. We also explained that
if they failed to stop, next stop trial would be easier because the
SSD was going to be shorter and it would be easier for them to
stop. We told them that they would fail on about 50% of stop
trials because the experimental program was designed to find the
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balance between the ability to stop and not and therefore, they
should not feel frustrated if they were not able to successfully
stop on all trials. We explained that both tasks (i.e., going and
stopping) were equally important and they should learn a trade-
off between them. After this, we proceeded to do a practice task,
which contained 6 blocks with 18 trials in each block. Once again
the experimenter read the instructions out from the computer
screen and additionally included information about the warning
buzz; the experimenter explained that this would help them to
gauge their performance and to guide them if any of their main
tasks required more attention. They would hear a buzz when a
response was too slow indicating that they needed to react faster
on the next trial. We explained that this buzz could occur after
certain or uncertain go trials. We also explained that they may
hear a buzz after a stop trial and this would mean that they had
failed to stop too many times and therefore needed to put extra
effort into stopping successfully.
Results
Testing the Assumptions of the Horse Race
Model
As described in the horse race model (Logan and Cowan, 1984),
independence of go and stop processes is assumed because failed
stop RTs are faster than the no signal RT. In this experiment
we had two RTs, one RT from the uncertain go and the other
from the certain go, therefore, we included these two go RTs in
the analysis of independence.We conducted a repeated-measures
2 × 2 × 3 ANOVA with within-subject factors of 2 response
modalities (manual, vocal), 2 stop probabilities (high and low),
and 3 RT types (certain go, uncertain go and failed stop). The
results revealed that all three factors were significant: response
modality [F(1, 43) = 46, p < 0.0001, N
2
p = 0.52], stop probability
[F(1, 43) = 1.2, p < 0.0001, N
2
p = 0.82] and RT type [F(2, 86) = 83,
p < 0.0001, N2p = 0.66]. The interaction between stop probability
and RT was also statistically significant [F(2, 86) = 1.2, p <
0.0001, N2p = 0.77]. All other interactions were non-significant.
Because the significant interaction of stop probability and RT
type confounds the main effect of these two factors we proceed
to describe only this interaction and the response modality main
effect.
The response modality factor showed that RTs of the manual
responses (M = 411ms, SE = 10) were 54ms earlier compared
to those of the vocal responses (M = 465ms, SE = 10).
The interaction of stop probability and RT showed that all RTs
from the high probability stop were statistically longer compared
to those of the low probability stop (p < 0.001 Bonferroni
corrected, see Appendix 3 in Supplementary Material for mean
and SE) by 20, 112, and 44ms in the certain go, uncertain go and
failed stop trials respectively. Across RTs, this interaction showed
that failed stop RTs were significantly shorter than for uncertain
go trials (p < 0.001) by 128 and 60ms in the high and low
probability stop conditions respectively. This result confirmed
the assumption of the horse race model in which failed stop
RTs should be faster than no stop signal RTs, suggesting the go
process won the race against the stop process in the failed stop
condition. Interestingly, failed stopping was not different from
certain go, p = 0.42 and 0.67 in the high and low probability
stops respectively. This finding also supports the assumptions of
the horse race model in which failed stop RTs are not different
from simple RT (described in more detail in the Discussion).
Go Reaction Times
A repeated measures 2 × 4 ANOVA was conducted for go
RTs that contained the within-subject factors of two response
modalities (manual, vocal) and four go-certainty types (certain
go-Low-probability-stop, certain go-High-probability-stop, uncertain
go-Low-probability-stop, and uncertain go-High-probability-stop). Both
factors, response modality [F(1, 43) = 44, p < 0.0001, N
2
p = 0.5]
and go-certainty type [F(3, 129) = 102, p < 0.0001, N
2
p = 0.7]
were statistically significant with a large effect size. The response
modality by go-certainty type interaction was not significant
[F(3, 129) = 0.3, p = 0.8, N
2
p = 0.006].
The factor of response modality (see Figure 2C) showed that
go RTs from the manual responses (M = 428ms, SE = 9)
were shorter compared to vocal responses by 51ms (M =
479ms, SE = 10). Furthermore, the factor of go-certainty
type (see Figure 2A) revealed that go RTs from the certain
go-Low-probability-stop (M = 395ms, SE = 6.6) were significantly
shorter: by 20ms relative to certain go-High-probability-stop (M =
415ms, SE = 6, p < 0.001), by 51ms compared to uncertain
go-Low-probability-stop (M = 446ms, SE = 12, p < 0.001) and
by 163ms compared to uncertain go-High-probability-stop (M =
558ms, SE = 16, p < 0.001). The go RTs from the certain
go-High-probability-stopwere also significantly shorter by 31ms
compared to uncertain go-Low-probability-stop (p < 0.05) and by
143ms compared to uncertain go-High-probability-stop (p < 0.001).
Finally, the uncertain go-Low-probability-stop was significantly
shorter compared to the uncertain go-High-probability-stop by
112ms.
Reactive Inhibition (SSRT)
A repeatedmeasures 2×2 ANOVAwas carried out for SSRTs with
the within-subject factors of two response modalities (manual,
vocal) and two stop probabilities(high and low probability stop).
Both factors, responsemodality [F(1, 43)= 7, p < 0.05, N
2
p = 0.14]
and stop probability [F(1, 43) = 34, p < 0.0001, N
2
p = 0.4],
were statistically significant. The response modality main effect
exhibited a medium effect size and the stop probability main
effect, a large effect size. The interaction of response modality and
stop probabilitywas not statistically significant [F(1, 43) = 0.003,
p = 0.96, N2p = 0.001].
Post-hoc analysis within the response modality factor revealed
that the SSRT of manual responses (M = 213ms, SE = 6)
was shorter by 17ms relative to the SSRT of vocal responses
(M = 230ms, SE = 6); see Figure 2C. Further, the
factor of stop probability showed that SSRT-Low-probability-stop
(M = 240ms, SE = 6) was 38ms longer compared to the
SSRT-High-probability-stop (M = 202ms, SE= 6); see Figure 2B.
Analyses of SSD and Accuracy of Stopping
Because we obtained a significant difference in SSRT between
vocal and manual responses, we wanted to make sure this
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FIGURE 2 | Results for go reaction times (go RT), stop signal reaction time (SSRT) and proactive inhibition across response modalities (manual and
vocal) and stop signal probabilities: high and low [2/3 stop and 1/3 stop trials following the uncertain go]. (A) Go reaction times for the two types of go RT
(certain go and uncertain go) across the two stop probabilities (low and high stop probabilities). (B) SSRT and proactive inhibition as a function of stop signal
probability. (C) Latencies for go-RT, SSRT and proactive inhibition across response modalities. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001; ****p < 0.0001. Error bars indicate standard
error of the mean (SEM).
difference was not driven by the difference in go RTs: vocal
responses compared to manual responses had longer go RTs. We
conducted repeated measures 2 × 2 ANOVA separately for SSD
and accuracy of stopping. We included the within-subject factors
of 2 response modalities (manual, vocal) and 2 stop probabilities
(high and low probability stop).
The results for the SSD revealed a significant difference in the
factors of responsemodality [F(1, 43) = 7.05, p < 0.05, N
2
p = 0.15]
and stop probability [F(1, 43) = 1.6, p < 0.01, N
2
p = 0.76].
The interaction of response modality by stop probability was
not significant [F(1, 43) = 1.49, p = 0.23, N
2
p = 0.04]. The
response modality factor showed that SSD of the vocal responses
(M = 265ms, SE = 16) were shorter by 38ms compared to
those of the manual responses (M = 303ms, SE = 18). In
addition, the stop probability factor revealed that the SSD of the
high probability stops (M = 333ms, SE = 17.3) were 99ms
longer than those of the low probability stops (M = 234ms,
SE= 14).
As for the results of accuracy of stopping, with the staircase
procedure, we expected a probability of successful stops and
failed stops of about 50% each (p_inhibit = 0.5; p_respond =
0.5). The ANOVA revealed a significant factor of stop probability
[F(1, 43) = 79.71, p < 0.01, N
2
p = 0.65], which revealed
that participants stopped slightly more successfully in the high
probability stop (p_inhibit = 0.52, SE = 0.005) relative to the
low probability stop (p_inhibit = 0.49, SE = 0.005). There were
no statistically significant effects of response modality [F(1, 43) =
0.93, p = 0.35, N2p = 0.03] or significant interaction between
response modality and stop probability [F(1, 43) = 1.49, p = 0.23,
N
2
p = 0.04]. For the response modality factor, both manual and
vocal responses had a p_inhibit of 0.51.
In sum, the results of the SSD and accuracy of stopping
analyses suggest that the differences in SSRT between
response modalities are not driven by the longer go RT as
across response modalities the SSDs were also significantly
different and the accuracy of stopping was statistically the
same.
Proactive Inhibition
A repeated measures 2× 2 ANOVA was conducted for proactive
inhibition with within-subject factors of 2 response modalities
(manual, vocal) and 2 stop probabilities (high and low probability
stop). The results revealed a significant effect of stop probability
[F(1, 43) = 1.9, p < 0.0001, N
2
p = 0.8]. No significant effects of
response modality [F(1, 43) = 0.001, p = 0.97, N
2
p = 0.0001]
or significant interaction between response modality and stop
probability [F(1, 43) = 1.4, p = 0.25, N
2
p = 0.03] were
found.
The significant effect of stop probability showed that proactive
inhibition for low probability stops (M = 51ms, SE = 9)
was 91ms significantly shorter compared to the high probability
stops(M = 142ms, SE= 14); see Figure 2B.
Correlations between Reactive and Proactive
Inhibitions
We carried out four correlation analyses between reactive
(measured by the SSRT) and proactive inhibition across
both response modalities and stop probabilities. The results
showed there were moderate negative, statistically significant
relationships between proactive-High-probability-stop and
SSRT-High-probability-stop in both response modalities: vocal
[r(42) = −0.35, p < 0.01] and manual [r(42) = −0.27,
p < 0.05]. These relationships revealed that more
advanced preparation for stopping in the high probability
stop condition was related to faster reactive stopping. See
Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material for the non-significant
correlations in the low probability stop conditions. Figure 3
depicts the correlation between the SSRT and proactive
inhibition.
Correlation between Reactive Inhibition and
Impulsivity
We carried out four correlation analyses between reactive
(measured by the SSRT) and impulsivity scores (both
dysfunctional and functional impulsivity scores) across both
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FIGURE 3 | Correlations between proactive and reactive inhibition across response modalities (manual and vocal) and stop probabilities: high and low
[2/3 and 1/3 stop trials following the uncertain go]. (A) Correlation between proactive inhibition and SSRT in the high probability stop condition for manual
responses. (B) Correlation between proactive inhibition and SSRT in the low probability stop condition for manual responses. (C) Correlation between proactive
inhibition and SSRT in the high probability stop condition for vocal responses. (D) Correlation between proactive inhibition and SSRT in the low probability stop
condition for vocal responses. Because our alternative hypothesis was in one direction, all Pearson’s correlations tested significance with a 1-tailed test.
response modalities and stop probabilities. The results showed
there was a positive, statistically significant relationship between
dysfunctional impulsivity and the SSRT-High-probability-stop for
manual responses [r(42) = 0.34, p < 0.05]. Likewise, there
were positive, statistically significant relationships between
dysfunctional impulsivity and the SSRT-Low-probability-stop for
manual responses [r(42) = 0.29, p < 0.05] and for vocal respones
[r(42) = 0.27, p < 0.05]. These relationships revealed that higher
scores of dysfunctional impulsivity are related to slower reactive
inhibition. See Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material for the
non-significant correlations between the SSRT-High-probability-stop
and dysfunctional impulsivity;and between the SSRTs (both
high and low probability stops) and functional impulsivity.
See Figure 4 for a graphical representation of the correlations
between the SSRT and impulsivity.
Correlation between Proactive Inhibition and
Impulsivity
We carried out 4 correlations in each response modality.
These correlations compared the index of proactive inhibition
across stop probabilities (high and low probability stops)
with scores on impulsivity scales (functional and dysfunctional
scores). All correlations were non-significant, the results of
these correlations can be found Appendix 2 in Supplementary
Material.
Correlation between Manual and Vocal
Responses
We conducted correlations between manual and vocal responses
across both go RT types (certain go and uncertain go) and both
inhibition types (reactive and proactive). The results revealed
strong, positive, statistically significant relationships between
manual and vocal responses in: certain go RT-High probability stop
[r(42) = 0.79, p < 0.0001]; uncertain go RT-High probability stop
[r(42) = 0.70, p < 0.0001]; proactive-High probability stop [r(42) =
0.75, p < 0.0001]; certain go RT-Low probability stop [r(42) = 0.62,
p < 0.0001]; uncertain go RT-Low probability stop [r(42) = 0.60, p <
0.0001]; proactive-Low probability stop [r(42) = 0.68, p < 0.0001]
and SSRT-Low probability stop [r(42) = 0.58, p < 0.0001]. These
relationships suggested that when one index in vocal responses
increased, the counterpart index in manual responses increased
too. There was only the correlation of SSRT-High probability stop
between responsemodalities that was not statistically significant
[r(42) = 0.14, p = 0.19]. These results are depicted in Figure 5.
Interestingly, the SSRT-High probability stop was the only index that
did not correlate with dysfunctional impulsivity.
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FIGURE 4 | Correlations between impulsivity score and reactive inhibition across response modalities (vocal and manual) and stop probabilities: high
and low [2/3 and 1/3 stop trials followed the uncertain go]. (A) Correlation between impulsivity score and SSRT in the high probability stop condition for manual
responses. (B) Correlation between impulsivity score and SSRT in the low probability stop condition for manual responses. (C) Correlation between impulsivity score
and SSRT in the high probability stop condition for vocal responses. (D) Correlation between impulsivity score and SSRT in the low probability stop condition for vocal
responses. Because our alternative hypothesis was in one direction, all Pearson’s correlations tested significance with a 1 tailed test.
Discussion
This study investigated reactive and proactive response inhibition
in two effector systems: vocal and manual. We also examined
the relationship between these two types of response inhibition
and self-reported functional and dysfunctional impulsivity. We
hypothesized that conditions where stopping was required with
a high probability (1/3 stops) compared to low probability (1/6
stops) stops would enhance both proactive and reactive response
inhibition. Secondly, we hypothesized that reactive and proactive
response inhibition would be positively related (a negative slope
in the correlation between SSRT and proactive inhibition). Last,
that SSRT and dysfunctional impulsivity would be positively
correlated, i.e., as dysfunctional impulsivity increased, SSRTs
would be slower. Our results provide evidence to support all of
these hypotheses, which are discussed in turn below.
High Compared to Low Probability Stop
Condition Increased Proactive and Enhanced
Reactive Response Inhibition
As predicted, we found that in the high relative to the low
probability stops, proactive inhibition was longer (by 91ms)
and SSRT was shorter (by 38ms). The results suggest that a
greater level of preparation for the impending stop signal was
implemented when there was a higher probability of stopping;
this preparation was also transferred to the go RT of the certain
go (only go) and the uncertain go (includes go and stop trials)
conditions, as go RTs were longer in the high compared to the
low probability stops. These findings are consistent with the
previous literature showing that go RTs are affected by stop
probability, e.g., go RTs are longer in the most frequent stop
signal conditions (Ramautar et al., 2004; Lansbergen et al., 2007)
and even after a stop-signal, e.g., go RTs are slower after a stop
trial (Rieger and Gauggel, 1999; Emeric et al., 2007; Verbruggen
et al., 2008; Verbruggen and Logan, 2008a). These findings
are also consistent with the proactive adjustment hypothesis
(Verbruggen and Logan, 2009b) that assumes subjects balance
stop and go processes by increasing the response threshold in the
go task when they expect more stop signals.
Supporting our hypothesis, apart from increased proactive
response inhibition, SSRTs were shorter in the high probability
stop condition. Interestingly, SSRT has also been observed to be
shorter in conditions in which participants are informed of the
position of the stop signal compared to an uninformed condition
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FIGURE 5 | Correlations between vocal and manual responses for both go RT types (certain and uncertain) and both inhibition types (proactive and
reactive). (A) Correlations for the high probability stop [2/3 stop trials followed the uncertain go]. (B) Correlations for the low probability stop [1/3 stop trials followed
the uncertain go].
(Smittenaar et al., 2013). This means, that more preparation
induced either by a high probability stop or an informed
condition enhances reactive inhibition. We also found that in
the high probability stops, participants stopped successfully more
often (p_inhibit 0.52 compared to 0.49 in the low probability), a
finding which is in line with Ramautar et al. (2004) and suggests,
participants are slightly biased toward successful inhibition over
fast responding. These finding is also consistent with more recent
studies that have shown that higher probability of stopping is
associated with prolonged go RT, indicating higher proactive
inhibition (Hu et al., 2015).
Contrary to the finding that the high probability stop enhances
reactive inhibition, other studies have found that changing
the stop probability has no effect on the SSRT (Logan and
Burkell, 1986; Ramautar et al., 2004; Lansbergen et al., 2007).
The reasons could be the small sample size in these previous
studies (∼13 participants) whereas our data comes from 44
participants. Another reason could be the percentage of the
high probability stops, for example, the high probability stop
condition in Ramautar et al. (2004) was 50% of stops and 50% of
go, whereas in our study the stops in the high probability were
66.66% of uncertain go, potentially eliciting more preparation.
Another reason for the differences could be the amount of stops,
while we had 100 stops for each stop probability, Logan and
Burkell (1986) had 48 stops in the low probability stop against
192 stops in the high probability stop. Finally, Lansbergen et al.
(2007) study was comparing differences in impulsivity, thus,
the participants recruited were 14 with the lowest scores in
impulsivity and 15 with the highest scores in impulsivity. This
could have made the results different to our study. In short, the
different findings we present in this study compared to those
previous studies (Logan and Burkell, 1986; Ramautar et al., 2004;
Lansbergen et al., 2007) could be related to the differences in
stop probability distributions, sample size, stop trial size and the
particular characteristics of the sample.
The assumption of the horse race model, in which failed stop
RTs should be faster than go RTs, was met in both stop probability
conditions, in line with previous studies (Logan and Cowan,
1984; Logan, 1994; Ramautar et al., 2004; Chikazoe et al., 2009).
On the other hand, the finding that SSRTs are different across stop
probabilities suggests that the stopping process is not constant, an
assumption that agrees with the independent horse race model. It
is worth noting that the independent horse race model estimates
the SSRT assuming “the finishing time of the stopping process
(stop signal reaction time) is constant” (Logan, 1994); “... the
assumption about stop signal reaction time makes mathematics
easier, but more importantly, it allows a graphic representation
of the underlying processes that illustrates the relationships very
clearly” (Logan, 1994); “the correctness of the assumption is
not very important. Logan and Cowan (1984) (mostly Cowan)
analyzed the formal consequences of the assumption, and found
that it introduced very small measurement errors” (Logan, 1994).
We conclude that greater levels of preparation, represented
by increased proactive inhibition in the high stop probability,
reduced the time of reactively stopping a prepotent response. We
further supported this idea with our second hypothesis, which is
described next.
Reactive and Proactive Response Inhibition have
a Positive Relationship
Our second hypothesis measured the relationship between
reactive and proactive inhibition. We found that a greater level of
preparation was related to reduced SSRT. This was only observed
for the high probability stops in both response modalities. These
findings support two out of three experiments in Chikazoe et al.
(2009) and Jahfari et al. (2010). Although the amount of stops was
very similar in these two studies (20% of stops in the uncertain go
condition and 25% of stops respectively) to our low probability
stop condition (33.33% of stops in the uncertain go), we did not
find that reactive and proactive were negatively related in the
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low probability stops, like one experiment in Jahfari et al. (2010).
We suggest that this could have been because participants, in
the two previous experiments that found a relationship, applied
more proactive inhibition compared to the low probability stops.
In fact, Jahfari et al. (2010) carried out two experiments and
only found that reactive and proactive inhibition were related
in experiment 1 where proactive inhibition was larger (111.3ms
in all trials) compared to experiment 3 in which proactive
inhibition was much smaller (55ms). Similarly, Chikazoe et al.
(2009) found that reactive and proactive inhibition were related
when proactive inhibition was 105.5ms. In our study, the
high probability stop condition elicited proactive slowing of
142ms compared to the low probability stop condition where
proactive slowing was only 51ms. These results suggest that
when participants used greater level of preparation to hold the
prepotent response (proactive inhibition), they could stop faster,
but that when they did not withhold the prepotent response
strongly, reactive inhibition was executed by other process not
related to the amount of proactive inhibition.
Taken together (hypotheses one and two), we conclude that
our findings are consistent with the proactive adjustment account
(Verbruggen and Logan, 2009b) in which participants balance
stop and go processes by increasing the go RT when the stop
probability increases. These results also support the account that
greater level of proactive inhibition enhances reactive inhibition.
It could be that this alert to hold the prepotent response
pre-activates some of the same neural circuitry responsible
for reactive inhibition but only when it is very likely that
stopping will occur, as described in Aron (2011). In short,
it seems that the go process and reactive inhibition interact
with proactive inhibition (Boucher et al., 2007; Verbruggen and
Logan, 2008b).
Relationship between Reactive Inhibition and
Dysfunctional Impulsivity
Our last hypothesis predicted that there would be a positive
relationship between the SSRT and dysfunctional impulsivity.
This is what we found, that slower SSRT (weaker reactive
stopping) was related with a higher score on dysfunctional
impulsivity (not functional impulsivity). This is consistent with
a previous study that used the same Dickman impulsivity
inventory (Dickman, 1990) and found this relationship existed
for vocal responses only (van den Wildenberg and Christoffels,
2010). We extended this relationship to manual responses,
which is consistent with other studies that have tested this
effector system and found that SSRTs were related to impulsivity
scores (Logan et al., 1997; Marsh et al., 2002; Farr et al.,
2012). This relationship between reactive inhibition and self-
reported impulsivity is consistent with pathological studies that
have found slower SSRTs in neuropsychological disorders where
impulsive behavior is a major characteristic (Rubia et al., 2001b;
Aron and Poldrack, 2005; Nigg et al., 2006; Menzies et al.,
2007; Penadés et al., 2007; Bohne et al., 2008; Enticott et al.,
2008). Interestingly, this relationship was only seen for reactive
inhibition and not for proactive inhibition, suggesting that
self-reported impulsivity is more related with overt inhibitory
responses.
However, some studies have found that no relationship existed
between the SSRTs and impulsivity (Avila and Parcet, 2001;
Rodrìguez-Fornells et al., 2002; Lijffijt et al., 2004; Lansbergen
et al., 2007). One of the reasons these studies did not find
a relationship could be that they used a different impulsivity
inventory; these studies used the 54 item Eysenck impulsivity
scale (I7, Eysenck et al., 1985). Studies that found a relationship
between SSRTs and impulsivity have used a different impulsivity
inventory, for example, Logan et al. (1997) used the Eysenck
Personality Inventory (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1969) which
contained 22 true-false questions; the other two studies (Marsh
et al., 2002; Farr et al., 2012) used the Barratt impulsiveness
scale, version 11 (Barratt and Patton, 1983). It is very likely
that these different impulsivity inventories are measuring
distinctive dimensions of impulsivity. For example, the subscales
measured in the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck and
Eysenck, 1969) are impulsivity and sociability whereas the
subscales measured in I7 are impulsivity, venturesomeness
and empathy. Another reason could lie in the characteristics
of the participants. While Logan et al. (1997) recruited
students, some of the studies that did not find a relationship
recruited high and low impulsive participants (Rodrìguez-
Fornells et al., 2002; Lijffijt et al., 2004; Lansbergen et al., 2007).
In short, the instruments to assess impulsive characteristics
and the characteristics of the participants may explain why
the SSRTs were not related with impulsivity scores in previous
studies.
Additional Findings Across Response Modalities
Across response modalities we found that the go RTs for vocal
responses were slower compared to those of manual responses.
This is consistent with previous studies (van denWildenberg and
Christoffels, 2010). Another study also found that naming part
words was slower compared to both manual and naming letters
(Xue et al., 2008). Other studies that have tested vocal responses
but not compared them directly with manual responses showed
that go RT of vocal responses is slower compared to those of
manual responses (Wessel and Aron, 2015).
We also found that the SSRT were slower in vocal compared
to manual responses but proactive inhibition was the same
across these two response modalities. These results cannot
really be explained with the proactive adjustment account that
suggests larger proactive inhibition enhances reactive inhibition.
Moreover, the SSDs were shorter in vocal compared to manual
responses. We explained this with the hypothesis that vocal
responses have less efficacious reactive inhibition. For example,
neurophysiological studies have suggested that corticobulbar
motoneurons (which supply some of the vocal muscles) are
sparser or less potent than the spinal motoneurons (limbmuscles;
Jaberzadeh et al., 2008; Ortu et al., 2008; Sowman et al., 2008; for
a review see Luschei and Goldberg, 2011). For example, studies
investigating the cortical silent period (CSP) on the muscles
of the vocalization system (cranial nerve V) describe shorter
CSP compared to studies investigating the CSP in the limb
system (Werhahn et al., 1995; Cruccu et al., 1997; Paradiso et al.,
2005; Jaberzadeh et al., 2008; Ortu et al., 2008; Sowman et al.,
2008).
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Finally, we found that both go RT (certain and uncertain
go), and both reactive and proactive inhibitions were positively
correlated between manual and vocal responses across both stop
probabilities. The only relationship across response modalities
that was not significant was between the SSRT in the high
probability stops. Surprisingly, the SSRT of vocal responses in
the high probability stops was not related with dysfunctional
impulsivity either. These results suggest that the SSRTs of the
high probability stops for vocal responses behave differently to
those of manual responses and does not relate with impulsivity.
The only reason we could think to explain this finding is
via the already described hypothesis that the vocal system
has less efficacious reactive stopping. Based on this account,
SSRTs of the vocal system might dissociate from those of the
manual responses in the high probability stop condition where
reactive stoppingmechanisms are under the highest performance
demand. However, further studies would be required to support
this hypothesis.
Conclusions
This study investigated response inhibition in two response
modalities (i.e., manual and vocal) and related them to self-
reported functional and dysfunctional impulsivity. We found
that high compared to low probability stops required more
proactive inhibition and produced faster reactive stopping. This
was further confirmed in a correlation analysis that showed
greater levels of preparation for stopping reduced the SSRT. We
also showed that SSRTs were related to dysfunctional impulsivity.
The implications of these findings extend the horse race model
by studying proactive response inhibition, which currently
encompasses only go RT and the SSRT variables. Our results
show that proactive inhibition can enhance reactive inhibition
by reducing the SSRT only when proactive inhibition is applied
strongly. From a therapeutic point of view, these findings can
help to reduce impulsive behaviors by for example, cognitive
reinforcement on functional instead of dysfunctional impulsivity;
in addition, cognitive training that favors increment of proactive
inhibition could potentially reduce impulsive behaviors.
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